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III. HOT PURSUIT: THE CASE OF R. v. MILLS AND OTHERS
A. Introduction
Fora number of years the government of the United Kingdom has afforded a high
priority to efforts to combat the misuse of drugs. Its multifaceted strategy attaches
importance to securing progress on a number of fronts including, inter alia, "inter-
national cooperation to reduce supplies from abroad" and "increasing the effec-
tiveness of police and Customs enforcement".1 In furtherance of these ends the
government has been an active participant in discussions and negotiations in a
number of different forums which have given birth to several innovative agree-
ments and arrangements of interest to the international lawyer.
The traditional international law of the sea has widely been regarded as provid-
ing insufficient flexibility to accommodate the needs of the law enforcement com-
munity when required to take action against foreign flag vessels suspected of
involvement in drug trafficking activities when located in international waters.1
Although there has been some interesting bilateral treaty practice in this regard,3
the primary emphasis has been on the elaboration of multilateral instruments of
which the arrangements contained in Article 17 of the 1988 UN Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances occupy pride
of place.' As has been noted elsewhere, this established international standards,
procedures and practices designed to facilitate the interdiction of drug shipments
by sea and the prosecution of those involved.3 This important international instru-
ment entered into force in late 1990 and had attracted 111 State parties as of 25
May 1995.
1. Tackling Drugs Together: A Consultation Document on a Strategy for England
1995-98 CnU678 (1994), p.21.
2. See e.g. W. C. Gilmore, "Drug Trafficking by Sea: The 1988 United Nations Conven-
tion Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances" (1991) IS Marine
Policy 183.184-185. See also U B. Sohn. "International Law of the Sea and Human Rights
Issues", in T. A. dingan (Ed.). The Law of the Sea: What Ues Ahead? (1988), p.53, at p.59.
Several agreements and arrangements have been concluded to permit law enforcement
action in the territorial sea. See e.g. "UK (British Virgin lslands)/US: 'Shiprider' Memor-
andum of Understanding", Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Release No.37,7 Feb.
1990.
3. See the 13 Nov. 1981 Exchange of Notes concerning Co-operation in the Suppression
of the Unlawful Importation of Narcotic Drugs into the United States, Cmnd.8470 (1981).
See also J. Siddlc, "Anglo-American Cooperation in the Suppression of Drug Smuggling"
(1982) 311.C.LQ. 726 and W. C. Gilmore, "Narcotics Interdiction at Sea: UK-US Cooper-
ation" (1989) 13 Marine Policy 218.
4. See e.g. W. C Gilmore, Combating International Drugs Trafficking: The 1988 United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
(1991). The UK played an influential role in the elaboration, within the framework of the
Council of Europe, of the 1995 Agreement on Illicit Traffic by Sea, Implementing Article 17
of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances. For the text of the agreement and the associated explanatory report see Council
of Europe Doc.CDPC(94)22, Addendum; 27 June 1994. See also W. C. Gilmore, "Narcotics
Interdiction at Sea: The 1995 Council of Europe Agreement" Marine Policy (forthcoming).
5. See Gilmore, op. ciL supra n l
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The United Kingdom ratified the 1988 Convention on 28 June 1991 and has
since extended its application to Bermuda and the remaining dependencies of the
Crown in the Caribbean basin.6 In so far as interdiction at sea is concerned, pri-
mary legislation was required in order to take advantage of the discretionary terms
of Article 4(1 )(b)(ii) to establish jurisdiction over relevant offences committed on
board the vessels of other State parties in international waters. The requisite auth-
ority was provided in the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990.'
Although action pursuant to the 1988 Convention is of ever increasing import-
ance in UK practice, circumstances continue to arise where the legal basis for
interference with foreign flag vessels on the high seas is sought in the general rules
relating to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction at sea." The November 1993 inter-
diction, known as "Operation Dash", carried out under the direction of HM Cus-
toms and Excise, is such a case. It involved the boarding of a St Vincent-registered
merchantman on the high seas and the subsequent prosecution of those involved.
It is of particular interest because of the light which it sheds on the nature and
potential scope of the right of hot pursuit and the associated doctrine of construc-
tive presence.
B. The Facts
Operation Dash involved a sophisticated trafficking operation to import some
6.25 tons of cannabis wjth an estimated street value of £24 million into the United
Kingdom. The cargo was shipped from Morocco on the diving support vessel M V
Poseidon, registered in the Caribbean island State of St Vincent and the Grena-
dines—which was not, at the relevant time, a party to the 1988 Convention." The
plan called for the Poseidon to effect a transfer of the cargo to a second vessel at
sea, which would then land it on UK territory. To that end one of the traffickers
inspected a British-registered fishing trawler, the Delvan, then lying in Cork Har-
bour in the Republic of Ireland. It was deemed suitable for the task and set sail
from Cork on the afternoon of 9 November 1993. Unknown to the conspirators, it
"was crewed by undercover Customs and Police Officers".10
6. This extension, which took effect on 8 Feb. 1995, applies to Anguilla, Bermuda, the
British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands.
7. (1990 cS) ss.18-21, and Sch.3. The provisions of the Act also extend to offences on
board British ships and stateless vessels. HM Customs and Excise Investigation Division is
the designated authority for dealing with all requests under An.17 and for instigating the
appropriate procedures. The enforcement powers of the Secretary of Slate under s.20 of the
1990 Act were transferred to the Commissioners of Customs and Excise by s.23 of the Crimi-
nal Justice Act 1993 (1993 c.36).
8. E.g. Art.17(11) of the 1988 UN Convention contains a non-derogation provision
which reads: "Any action taken in accordance with this article shall take due account of the
need not to interfere with or affect the rights and obligations and the exercise of jurisdiction
of coastal States in accordance with the international law of the sea." To similar effect see
Art.2(3) of the 1995 Council of Europe Agreement, supra n.4.
9. St Vincent subsequently became a party, by accession, on 17 May 1994.
10. R. v. Mills and Others (unreported ruling on jurisdiction and abuse of process issues
delivered in 1995 by His Honour Judge Devonshire at Croydon Crown Court). The undated
typescript and other relevant information utilised in this article, including the co-ordinates
for the point of seizure of the Poseidon (map point B). were kindly provided by the Solicitor's
Office, HM Customs and Excise, London.
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Acting on prior intelligence a task force was assembled under the direction of
HM Customs and Excise. It initially consisted of HMS Avenger, a Type 21 frigate,
and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Ship (RFA) Olna. A Lynx helicopter was based on
the former and two Sea King helicopters on the latter." A small team of Customs
officers was also embarked.
Shortly before midnight on 9 November HMS A venger established radar con-
tact with the Poseidon and ascertained that it was in international waters. "By 1025
on the 10th the Poseidon and the Delvan had rendezvoused at . . . a position some
100 miles west of the Scillies and 100 miles south of Ireland in International Waters
(indicated as position A on the map on p. 952). The rendezvous was monitored on
radar by HMS Avenger and lasted from 1025 to 1440 when the Delvan opened
from the Poseidon. During the rendezvous some VA tons of cannabis were trans-
ferred to the Delvan. The whole cargo could not be transferred because of the
weather. At all times during the operation both vessels remained in international
waters."12
At this stage the offload vessel set a course for the south coast of England while
the Poseidon headed in a south-westerly direction back into the Atlantic. The
ships of the task force continued to shadow the latter" while the Delvan was moni-
tored from early on the morning of 11 November by the Customs cutter Seeker,
which had been despatched from Plymouth for that purpose.14 Shortly thereafter
the Delvan entered British territorial waters. However, no immediate steps were
taken to arrest either vessel. The strategy adopted by Customs was to allow the
Delvan to land in the United Kingdom thus permitting the ready seizure of its
cargo and the arrest of the shore party. As Judge Devonshire was to note in the
course of the subsequent judicial proceedings at Croydon Crown Court, it was
clear from the evidence "that the arrest of the Poseidon was secondary to that
aim".15
The Delvan was kept under continuous surveillance by the Customs cutter dur-
ing its somewhat leisurely passage through British waters16 which culminated with
its arrival in the south coast port of Littlehampton at 21.00 hours on 12 November.
The cargo was unloaded and the Delvan departed Littlehampton at 21.10 hours.17
The shore party was arrested shortly thereafter. The Customs officer in charge of
the operation, who was based in London, was advised of these developments and
he, in turn, requested that the Ministry of Defence order the task force to stop and
arrest the Poseidon. This was done at 23.13 hours." As Judge Devonshire has
noted: "At the time when the authority to arrest the Poseidon was received she
11. See idem, p.2.
12. Mem. p.3.
13. See idem, p.4.
14. See idem, p.3.
15. Idem.p.l.
16. Which included a 2V4-hour period in which it was anchored in Shanklin Bay. See idem.
p.3.
17. The one conspirator on board the offload vessel, one Mr J. Maezele. disembarked at
Littlehampton thus leaving the Delvan under the sole control of the undercover officers. See
ibid. Maezele subsequently entered a guilty plea and received a 4W-year sentence.
18. See idem, pp3-4.
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was in International Waters and had never entered the territorial waters of any
state.""
For a variety of reasons, including the relative size and construction of the ves-
sels in question and the prevailing weather conditions, the decision was taken to
effect the boarding of the Poseidon by helicopter and at first light.20 Three helicop-
ters were used early on 13 November. The commander of the task force
first attempted to call the Poseidon by name by VHF radio on Channel 16 on two
separate occasions commencing at 0733, but received no reply. The content of these
messages did not include my order to stop or heave to. By this time the helicopten
were hovering in close proximity to the Poseidon, the Lynx was within 40 feet. The
Lynx helicopter communicated with the Poseidon on VHF radio channel 16 and sent
a message "You are ordered by Customs to heave to".21
Although this message was repeated, "No reply to any call from the Lynx was
received."11 The boarding was then carried out (see point B on the map above) and
control of the vessel secured prior to 08.00 hours—some 65 hours and 20 minutes
having elapsed since the Delvan had opened from Poseidon following the partial
transfer of her illicit cargo and more than 54 hours after the former had first
reached British territorial waters.
19. Idem, p.4.
20. See idem, pp.4-5.
21. Idem,p5.
22. Ibid.
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The members of the crew were arrested and, along with the Poseidon, brought
to Portsmouth and charged with conspiracy to import cannabis.23 "Soon after the
defendants had first been brought before the magistrates the Crown gave notice to
them by letter dated 8th December 1993 that they had been arrested in inter-
national waters in exercise of the right of 'hot pursuit' contained in international
law which is to be found in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 1958.""
C. The Judicial Proceedings
When, in the spring of 1995, the case came before Judge Devonshire at Croydon
Crown Court six of the defendants, all of whom had been aboard the Poseidon,
applied to stay the indictment. They contended that they were before the court as a
direct consequence of an arrest which had taken place on the high seas in violation
of international law.23 They argued that the circumstances were such that the court
should, in the light of the House of Lords decision in R. v. Horseferry Road Magis-
trates' Court, exparte Bennett,™ exercise its supervisory jurisdiction and stay the
proceedings on the ground of abuse of process.27
Following extensive argument on this point the judge issued a ruling in which he
held that "the Poseidon was properly arrested in international waters under the
terms of the Geneva Convention and in accordance with the provisions of the
international law of the sea".2" He consequently disallowed the defendants' appli-
cation, thus permitting the criminal prosecution to go forward. Subsequently
charges against four of the six were, for a variety of reasons, dropped. A conviction
was, however, secured against one of the individuals who had been on board the
Poseidon and another entered a guilty plea. On 16 June they were sentenced to
seven and a half and three and a half years' imprisonment respectively. At the time
of writing no appeals proceedings have been initiated.
In arriving at his ruling on the abuse of process application the judge com-
mented extensively on the right of hot pursuit and the associated doctrine of con-
structive presence.N Basic to his approach was the view that Article 23 of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, to which the United Kingdom but not St
Vincent was a party, constituted a codification of pre-existing customary inter-
national law.30 In his view: "The right of 'hot pursuit' under which the Poseidon
23. See "Navy Prize Crew Seizes Drug Ship". Daily Telegraph (London), 18 Nov. 1993.
24. Mills ruling, supra n.10, at p.7.
23. The intervention had been undertaken without the prior consent of the flag State. It is
of interest to note that St Vincent made no protest to the UK following the arrest of the
Poseidon: see idem, pp.9-10.
26. [1994] 1 A.C. 42. Also reported as Bennett v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court and
Another [1993] 3 All E.R. 138. See also A. L.-T. Choo, "Ex parte Bennett: The Demise of the
Male Captus, Bene Detentus Doctrine in England?" (1994) 5 Crim. L. Forum 165. This is not
the first occasion on which an unsuccessful attempt has been made to invoke Bennett in
respect of an arrest in international waters. See R. v. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p. Newall
(unrep. Gibraltar Supreme Court decision delivered by Kneller O on 8 Oct. 1993). Type-
script kindly provided by the office of the Attorney General of Gibraltar.
27. See Mills ruling, supra n.10, at pp.1 and 12.
28. ldem,p.22.
29. Other questions considered included the enforcement of treaty rights at the behest of
individuals and the powers of the Crown Court in respect of abuse of process proceedings.
30. See e.g. Mills ruling, jupra n.10, at p.13. The judge so regarded the 1958 Convention as
a whole: see idem, pp.8-9.
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was arrested is a power conferred by the general principles of international law of
which the Geneva Convention was merely declaratory."" Furthermore, he sub-
scribed to the view that such customary rules "had been incorporated in the Com-
mon Law of England".11
Having reached this not entirely unconlroversial conclusion regarding Article
23-u Judge Devonshire proceeded to examine the central question of whether or
not the various requirements for the exercise of the right set out in Article 23 had
been complied with during Operation Dash. He paid particular attention to the
doctrine of constructive presence, the requirement of immediacy, and the accept-
ability of the use of VHF radio in issuing the order to the Poseidon to stop. Com-
pliance by the United Kingdom with the remaining conditions was seemingly
regarded as being sufficiently clear from the facts of the case. As we have seen, for
example, considerable evidence was available as to the location of both the offload
vessel and the Poseidon at all times considered relevant for the satisfaction of the
requirement contained in Article 23(3).* Similarly, he was satisfied on the facts
that the right of pursuit had not been lost, under Article 23(2), by virtue of the
entry of the Poseidon into the territorial sea of any third State.-13 He was also per-
suaded that the vessels of the task force and the helicopters which effected the
boarding met the authorisation and related requirements contained in Article
23(4)."
1. Constructive presence
It is beyond controversy that the rules relating to hot pursuit in international
law, conventional or customary, have developed in a manner which encompasses
the concept of constructive presence. As Lord McNair has explained: "When a
foreign ship outside territorial waters sends boats into territorial waters which
commit offences there, the mother ship renders herself liable to seizure by reason
of these vicarious operations."" However, there has been a spirited debate over
the years as to the scope of this doctrine.4 It will be recalled that in its final draft
articles, prepared in 1956, the International Law Commission lent its weight to the
narrow, or "simple", version which required the use within territorial waters of the
boats of the mother ship itself." However, at the 1958 Geneva Conference on the
31. Idem, p. 10.
32. Idem, p.9.
33. As the present writer has noted elsewhere there are reasons to doubt that the inclusion
of an extended rather than simple version of the doctrine of constructive presence in Art.23
(3) was, at least in 1958, merely declaratory of existing customary law. See W. C. Gilmore,
"Hot Pursuit and Constructive Presence in Canadian Law Enforcement" (1988) 12 Marine
Policy 105,108-110 and the references cited therein. See also e.g. R. R. Churchill and A. V.
Lowe, The Law of the Sea (2nd edn, 1988), pp.112-113. More generally, as D. P. O'Conncll
has noted, "Article 23 ... introduced a number of qualifications which had not been clearly
expressed in State practice": The International Law of the Sea (I. A. Shearer (Ed.), 1984),
Vol.II. p. 1079.
34. E.g. he noted. Mills ruling, supra n.10, at p. 19; "The undisputed evidence shows that
the identity and position of the Poseidon was known at all times to HMS Avenger."
35. See idem, p.4.
36. See e.g. idem, p.2.
37. A. D. McNair, International Law Opinions (1956), Vol.1, p.245.
38. See supra n.33.
39. See e.g. (1956) II Y.B.I.L.C 284-285.
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Law of the Sea. a proposal by Mexico to broaden the doctrine was carried in spite
of the opposition of a number of States, including the United Kingdom.* This
decision is reflected in Article 23(3), which reads, in relevant part, thus:41
Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has satisfied itself by
such practicable means as may be available that the ship pursued or one of its boats or
other craft working as a team and using the ship pursued as a mother ship are within the
limits of the territorial sea. or as the case may be within the contiguous zone.
Given the view of Judge Devonshire that Article 23 of the 1958 Convention
codified customary law, the discussion in this instance inevitably came to focus on
whether the relationship between the Poseidon and the Delvan was such as to
satisfy the Article 23(3) requirements: namely, team work and the existence of a
mother ship relationship. Such terms are not further defined in the Convention. In
this regard the judge first turned his attention to the controversial question of
whether Article 23(3) covered one-off instances of the unloading of contraband by
prearrangement. Citing the December 1976 Italian decision of Re Putos*1 and the
1986 Canadian case of R. v. Sunila and Solayman,** among other authorities, he
concluded that it did.44
This was not, however, sufficient to dispose of the issue in these circumstances.
As the judge noted: "All the cases to which I have referred... were cases in which
the daughter ship had come from the shore of the pursuing state and returned to
those shores."" In the instant case the Delvan had set out from a port in the Repub-
lic of Ireland not the United Kingdom. In the view of the judge, however, the
"essential element" common to the authorities was the fact of transhipment by
prearrangement and, consequently, the country of departure was irrelevant.* He
stated:"
It is clear to me that the policy consideration behind [the] doctrine is the prevention of
the commission of crimes in the territorial waters of the state which exercises the right
to hot pursuit. That consideration would be defeated if the point of departure was
relevant, mother ships hovering outside territorial waters could never be arrested if
the daughter ship departed from a different jurisdiction to her ultimate destination.
2. Immediacy
Judge Devonshire next turned to the significance, if any, which attached to the
time lag between the entry of the Delvan into UK territorial waters and the com-
mencement of the pursuit of the Poseidon.** In doing so he considered the flexi-
40. See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records, Vol.IV,pp.8l
and 91.
41. Emphasis added. See also Art.23{l).
42. (1976)77Int.L.Rep.587.
43. (1986)28D.L.R.(4th)450.
44. See MI7/J ruling, jupron. 10. at p.l 6. For an overview of the differing positions adopted
in the literature on this point see e.g. Gilmore, op. at. supra nJ3. at pp.110-111.
45. Mills, idem. p. 17.
46. Sec ibid.
47. Idem, pp.17-18. The principle of objective territorial jurisdiction is often cited as a
theoretical justification for the doctrine of constructive presence. See N. M. Poulantzas, The
Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law (1969). p.244. It would not appear to be departed
from or otherwise undermined in such instances.
48. The defence submitted that pursuit should have been undertaken immediately after
the Delvan entered the territorial sea of the UK: see Mills, idem, p. 18.
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bility which had been afforded to the treatment of the notion of immediacy of the
pursuit in both the academic literature" and in the somewhat similar case of R. v.
Sunila and Solayman*
In seeking to apply the law to the facts he first noted that "the offence of con-
spiracy was not necessarily complete until the drugs landed in Littlehampton. It
was therefore arguable that the right to hot pursuit had not arisen until that
time."" The subsequent passage of several hours between the receipt by the task
force of the order to stop the Poseidon and the time when the helicopter operation
was commenced for that purpose was similarly not regarded as fatal. In his view,
"the commander of the Naval Forces was justified, having regard to all the ambient
conditions, sea state and light, to delay the commencement of the hot pursuit until
[first light] because the purpose of the pursuit, boarding and arrest was not capable
of fulfilment at the earlier time and in those circumstances".52
3. The order to stop
The final issue to be confronted arose from the requirement, contained in Arti-
cle 23(3), that "pursuit may only be commenced after a visual or auditory signal to
stop has been given at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign
ship". As was noted above, in this instance the signal to stop was transmitted from
the Lynx helicopter by way of VHF radio. Counsel for the defendants argued that
the operation thus failed to comply with the conditions governing the lawful exer-
cise of the right of hot pursuit.33
It will be recalled that the absence of specific reference to the legitimacy of the
use of radio signals in this context, which applies equally to pursuit by aircraft by
virtue of Article 23(S)(a), was not the result of an oversight in the drafting process.
As the International Law Commission stated in its 1956 commentary to draft Arti-
cle 47: "To prevent abuse, the Commission declined to admit orders given by
wireless, as these could be given at any distance; the words 'visual or auditory
signal' exclude signals given at a great distance and transmitted by wireless."54The
Commission also noted that "signals by wireless are barred in the case of aircraft
also"."
49. The vicwi of Poulantzat, op. ciL supra n.47, and C. H. Allen, "Doctrine of Hot Pursuit:
A Functional Interpretation Adaptable to Emerging Maritime Law Enforcement Technol-
ogies and Practices" (1989) 20 Ocean Dev. and Int.L. 309,318 were cited in this context. See
Mills, ibid. See also e.g. O'Connell, op. cii. supra n33, at p.1076 and M. S. McDougal and W.
T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans (1962), p.914.
50. Supra n.43, at pp.454.459-460. See also Mills, idem, p. 19. Judge Devonshire also con-
sidered that the historical justification for the conditions of immediacy and continuity of
pursuit was to ensure that an innocent vessel was not arrested in error. He was satisfied that
there would have been no difficulty of that kind in this case: see ibid.
51. Idem. p.20. Such a view is somewhat surprising in the light of the Court of Appeal
judgment in R. v. Sansom and Others [1991] 2 All E.R. 145. In that case, which also involved
drug trafficking by sea, Taylor U held that an extraterritorial conspiracy to commit a crimi-
nal offence in England would be triable in England even in the absence of an overt act within
the jurisdiction. See also Liangsiriprasen v. United States Government and Another [1990)2
AU E.R. 866.
52. Mills, ibid
53. See idem, p.21.
54. Op. cil. supra n39, at p.285.
55. Ibid.
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Judge Devonshire was aware of this drafting history.5* He was, nonetheless,
persuaded that this should not be regarded as constituting an absolute bar to the
use of radio signals. Although he cited a number of academic writings which urged
a flexible view of this issue,37 he appears to have been influenced, in particular, by
evidence "that VHF radio is now trie standard method of communication between
vessels at sea which are required by International Radio Regulations to keep a
watch on Channel 16".5* VHF radio sets, in working order, were located on the
bridge of the Poseidon and a copy of the relevant radio regulations was also found
on board.** The presence of three helicopters hovering close to the vessel" at the
time of the transmission of the radio signals was also regarded as relevant.61 He
concluded "that the messages sent by this medium comply with the preconditions
of the Convention to the exercise of the right of hot pursuit".*2 In his opinion:
"Modern technology has moved on since 1958 and the law must take account of
those changes.""
D. Conclusions
It is widely accepted that: "Although the general parameters of the right of hot
pursuit are not controversial, the proper exercise of the right is less clear in circum-
stances that do not fall neatly within the black letter rule."*4 In this case Judge
Devonshire resolved all such uncertainties in a manner which fully favours the
policy goal of the effective enforcement of the criminal law.65 Such an approach
cannot, however, be taken save at the expense of other central and long-estab-
lished values of the international legal order.
Colombos, for example, articulated a radically different and arguably more
orthodox form of analysis when he opined that "the right of pursuit, being a dero-
gation from the general rule prohibiting any interference by a State with foreign
vessels on the high seas, ought to be interpreted in a narrow sense".** Had the
56. See Mills ruling, supra n.10, at p.21.
57. The judge cited the views of McDougal and Burke, op. cit. supra n.49, at p.897 as
authority for the approach adopted: see Mills, ibid. However, those contained at pp.917-918
and 923 seem to uphold, with regret, the orthodox position. Judge Devonshire also cites
Allen, op. cit. supra n.49, at p.319. Whether that author was speaking de lege laia or de lege
ferenda in writing that "most modem publicists agree that enforcing craft should be permit-
ted to give the initial signal by radio" is open to question; see also pp.322-323. If the former,
in citing McDougal and Burke as authority, he may have fallen into the same apparent error
as the judge: see p.335, n.150.
58. Mills, Idem, p.22.
59. See idem, p.6.
60. See idem, p.5.
61. See idem, p.22. There is some authority to the effect that in certain circumstances the
initiation of the pursuit may itself be sufficient notice to the offending vessel that it should
heave to. See The Newton Bay 36 F. (2d) 729.731-732 (2nd Cir. 1929). See also R. C Reu-
land. "The Customary Right of Hot Pursuit Onto the High Seas; Annotations to Article 111
of the Law of the Sea Convention" (1993) 35 VirgJ.lnt.L. 557, 583-584 and M. M. White-
man, Digest of International Law (1965), Vol.4, p.685.
62. Mills, ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Reuland, op. cit. supra n.61 at p.557.
65. An approach favoured by some commentators: see e.g. Allen, op. cit. supra n.49, at
pJ22.
66. C. J. Colombos, The International Law of the Sea (6th edn, 1967), p.170.
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judge given greater weight to the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas in the
interpretation of, for example, the nature and extent of the concept of extended
constructive presence the outcome might well have been both different and more
consistent with the traditional approach of the UK government.'7 His preference
for an interpretation sensitive to the needs of the law enforcement community is,
however, most evident in the treatment of the use of VHF radio to give the order to
the Poseidon to stop. Here, the decision to disregard the clear drafting history of
Article 23(3) and uphold the validity of the use of such methods is open to ques-
tion." The contention that the law must be construed in a manner which takes
account of technological change may also be regarded as losing some of its initial
attraction when it is recalled that the 1958 Convention wording is repeated, verba-
tim, in Article 111 (4) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.
For these reasons, among others, it would no doubt be of value were any appeal
process to afford the opportunity to a higher court to give this most interesting case
further and more detailed consideration.
WILLIAM C. GILMORE*
67. British opposition to the extended doctrine of constructive presence long predates its
negative vote at the 1958 Conference on the Mexican amendment to which reference was
made above: see e.g. Poulantzas, op. cit. supra n.47. at p.76, n.21. Judge Devonshire was
familiar with this fact see Mills ruling, supra n.10, at p. 16.
68. This notwithstanding the fact that the approach of the ILC and the 1958 Conference
has been subject to criticism from a practical viewpoint. See e.g. O'Connell. op. cit. supra
n.33, at p.1091. and F. Wooldridge, "Hot Pursuit", in Encyclopedia of Public International
Law (1989), Vol.11. p.145, at p.146.
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